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Introduction 
    The study of thinking and reasoning is a topic of central interest for 
economists, anthropologists, logicians, pedagogues and of course for 
psychologists. A central problem in the experimental investigation in 
Psychology is to describe how people think and reason deductively and 
inductively. 
    There are three fundamental theoretical approaches to deductive reasoning 
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    There are several proponents of a universal mental logic (Inhelder & 
Piaget, 1958) or natural logics (Braine, 1978, 1990, 1994; Braine & O´Brien, 
1991; Braine & Rumain, 1981, 1983; Osherson, 1974, 1975; Rips, 1983, 
1990, 1994). Other authors propose that reasoning is based on construction 
and evaluation of mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & 
Byrne, 1991). A third approach asserts that reasoning is not based on general 
inference rules and assumes that people have domain-specific reasoning 
mechanisms such as pragmatic reasoning schemas inductively acquired 
(Cheng & Holyoak, 1985, 1989; Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett & Oliver, 1986; 
Holyoak & Cheng, 1995) or innates procedures for identify potential 
deviations from social contracts (Cosmides 1985, 1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 
1992). 
    Psychometrics studies the thinking from a different perspective. The 
central interest for the researchers in Psychometrics is not the understanding 
of underlying cognitive processes and mental representations but the study 
of the individual differences in these mental processes. 
    However, despite the differences between these two approaches to the 
study of human reasoning the categorical syllogisms and linear syllogisms 
were included on early intelligence tests (Burt, 1919, 1921; Guilford, 1959; 
Thurstone, 1938). Moreover, in the past decades there is a novel and 
comparatively neglected field: the study of qualitative and quantitative 
differences in reasoning. Roberts (1993, p. 575) suggested that: 
    "The problem of individual differences is as follows: if a theory of 
reasoning is being proposed that is intended to describe the processes used 
by all people for all reasoning tasks, then what is the status of this theory if 
it is subsequently found that not all people are using the same processes?." 
 
 
    Galotti, Baron & Sabini (1986) examined the correlates of reasoning 
ability on a syllogistic reasoning task. They found evidence for the use of 
both models and rules of reasoning. In a previous work Sternberg and Weil 
(1980) found individual differences in reasoning strategies (a mental model 
strategy, a deduction rule strategy and a mixture of both) in the resolution of 
experimental tasks that involve linear syllogisms. 
    Alternatively, Sternberg and Gastel (1989) investigated information 
processing during the solution of inductive reasoning problems (analogies, 
classifications and series completions) and also administered five 
psychometric tests to each subject. They showed correlations between 
experimental tasks and psychometric tests. These correlations address two 
principal questions: 
    First, are scores on the experimental tasks related to scores on the 
psychometric tests?. Second, do the correlations with the reasoning tests 
differ from those with verbal/perceptual factor?. It was found that the 
correlations of the experimental task with the reasoning tasks are higher than 
those with verbal/perceptual tasks. Thus, "the experimental tasks do appear 
to tap abilities related to those tapped by the psychometric tests" (p. 8). 
    Despite the importance of conditional reasoning in daily life, the study of 
qualitative individual differences has not become a central focus in cognitive 
or psychometric studies. There is no nearly previous experimental research 
about this issue. We found in a previous study (Valiña, Seoane, Ferraces & 
Martín, 1995) a considerably better performance in the Wason´s selection 
task in the higher verbal group (DAT-VR) but there were no differences 
between subjects with high and low scores on the PMA-E psychometric test.        
In the present experiment we explore the relation among different measures 
 
 
in psychometric ability tests (verbal comprehension and reasoning) and the 
performance of this experimental conditional reasoning task. 
The experimental task. 
    The Wason´s selection task is one paradigm widely used for studying 
conditional reasoning. The original problem was elaborated by Wason 
(1966, 1968). He presented a conditional rule: “very card that has a vowel 
on one side has an even number on the other” and four cards: E, K, 4 and 7. 
The subjects´ task is to decide which cards should be turned over to test the 
conditional rule. 
    Frequently, the subjects only selected the E card (p) or the E and 4 cards 
(p and q). The correct response is the selection of the E and 7 cards (p and not 
q), but only 5-10% of the subjects chose these cards. The subjects selected a 
case for which the rule is true, but it is a negative instance which provides a 
violating case and can prove the truth or the falsity of the rule. 
    We selected this task in part because has long been of interest to 
experimental psychologist (see Evans, 1982, 1984, 1989; Evans, Newstead 
& Byrne, 1993; Newstead & Evans, 1995, Wason, 1983, for revisions) and 
moreover because it is one of the most widely used paradigm for studying 
the importance of factors related to the role of pragmatic knowledge in 
reasoning (Chrostowski & Griggs, 1985; Girotto, Gilly, Blaye & Light, 
1989; Griggs, 1983, 1989; Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi & Legrenzi, 1972; 
Manktelow & Over, 1991; Pollard & Evans, 1987; Valiña, Seoane, Ferraces 
& Martín, 1995, 1996; Wason, 1983; Wason & Shapiro, 1971; Yachanin, 
1986). 
    Concretely, in this paper we examined the following questions: (1) the 
relation among different measures in psychometric ability tests (verbal 
 
 
comprehension and reasoning), computerized measure of comprehension 
skills and the subjects´ performance in the experimental task of conditional 
reasoning, (2) whether or not good and poor comprehenders sistematically 
differ in their performance in Wason´s selection task (Wason, 1966, 1968) 
and (3) the differential influence of rule content and instructions on the 




    One hundred and fifty-four undergraduates (20 males, 134 females; mean 
age 21 years), studying Psychology at the University of Santiago de 
Compostela (Spain) collaborated in this study. The students participated as 
partial fulfillment of a course requirement. They didn´t perform a similar 
experiment before and none had any prior training in formal logic.  
    Data from 18 participants were not used because they failed to follow the 
experimental instructions or they had not completed all the task. 
 
Materials and apparatus 
1) Psychometric tests 
    The participants completed three spanish versions of three psychometric 






2) Gernsbacher´s Comprehension Battery 
    The spanish version of the Battery was presented on a DX-486 computer 
using a computer programme elaborated by Manuel de Vega, of the 
University of La Laguna (Spain). The programme presents 4 narrative texts 
with times of exposition on the screen of 3,5 seconds for each sentence. 
Subjects read sentences that were presented sentence-by-sentence on the 
computer monitor. After the last sentence of each story disappeared, a test of 
five alternative questions about each experimental text appeared. The time 
of presentation of each question about the story were of 20 seconds. The 
subjects´ task was to select as rapidly and accurately as possible the correct 
alternative that had occurred in the text they had just finished reading. 
Finally, the programme presented the next text 15 seconds after the final 
response of the subject. 
    The programme registered both the correct responses and the reaction 
times of the participants to the questions about the stories. 
3) Selection task 
    Each subject received three rules, with the following types of content: 
abstract, thematic-permission and thematic-obligation. Half of the subjects 
received true-false instructions of the rule and the other half violation 
instructions. The test booklets were used in previous investigations (Martín, 
1996; Valiña et al., 1996). The information for each of the three tasks was as 
follows: 
    a) Abstract selection task. "If a Wasit card has an A on one side, then it 
must have a 3 on the other". The four cards presented to the subjects were: 
"A", "K", "3" and "7". 
 
 
    b) Thematic-permission. In this rule a law was expressed; therefore it is 
similar to permission. The rule was: "If a person is more than 18 years old, 
then he has the right to vote". The four cards said: "20 years old", "16 years 
old", "you have the right to vote" and "you do not have the right to vote". 
    c) Thematic-obligation. The rule expressed a traffic regulation: "If a 
person rides a motorbike, then they must wear a helmet". The four cards that 
were represented were: "motorbike", "car", "helmet" and "cap". 
    The instructions were used previously (Chrotowski & Griggs, 1985; 
Valiña et al., 1995, 1996; Yachanin, 1986). In the true-false version, the 
instructions were: 
        "Your task consists of selecting cards and only those that must be turned 
over to decide if the rule is true or false (select those cards which you 
consider necessary to turn over to check if the person carrying out the 
experiment has lied or not in relation to the composition of the rule". 
    For the violation version, the instructions were: 
    "Your task consists of selecting only those cards that must be turned over    
in order to decide if the rule is being violated or not". 
    Two different versions were made for each of the types of booklets. In one 
of these the thematic versions were at the beginning, followed by the abstract 
rule and in the other the abstract version was included at the beginning. 








    Participants met in groups of up to 12 with two experimenters over 2 days. 
On the 1st day they received in the laboratory both the psychometric tests 
with conventional instructions and the spanish version of the Gernsbacher´s 
Comprehension Battery. Subjects were tested with each interacting on a 
separate microcomputer in the same laboratory. 
    On the 2nd day of the experiment, participants were assigned at random 
to one of two experimental groups: (1) true-false instructions and (2) 
violation instructions. Subjects were tested in groups of 12. Each subject 
received a booklet with instructions on the first page, followed by three 
selection tasks (an abstract one and two thematic selection tasks). The 
instructions were read to the subjects and questions were solicited to ensure 
that they understood the instructions. Finally, they were instructed to work 
at their own rhytm, without a time limit. 
 
RESULTS 
    The analysis were carried out with the data from the 136 subjects, once 
those who had not completed the task had been eliminated. 
    First we performed ANOVAs to test the differential influence of rule 
content and instruction on the subjects´ performance in the selection task 
(Wason, 1966, 1968). Other ANOVAs were performed for checking whether 
or not good and poor comprehenders sistematically differ in their execution 
in Wason´s selection task, and finally we performed analysis in order to 
provide a test of the relation among different measures in psychometric 
 
 
ability tests (verbal comprehension and reasoning), the computerized 
measure of comprehension skills and the subjects´ performance in the 
experimental task of conditional inference. 
   
    1) ANOVAS 
    The logical and matching indices were calculated for each of the three 
tasks. Both indices vary between +2 and -2, according to Pollard and Evans 
(1987). In the logical index the p or not-q selection gave a mark of +1 and 
the not-p or q selection gave -1. In the matching index the p or q selection 
gave a mark of +1 and with -1 the not-p or not-q selection. ANOVAS 2 x 3 
(instructions x content) were made for each type of index, with the data from 
the 136 participants. 
 
   1.a) Logical index 
    For the logical index the principal effects of the content (F(1.82; 244.52)= 
21.61; p < .0001;  = .912) and the instructions (F(1, 134) = 6.59; p <.011) 
were registered. In the thematic-obligation higher logical indices were 
obtained (M=.765), followed by the abstract version of the task (M=.449) 
and the thematic-permission (M =.154). Similarly, the logical indices were 
higher in those subjects who received violation instructions (M= .87) 
compared with those who received true-false instructions (M=.31). 
    Significant interactive effects have also been registered for instructions x 
content (F(1.82; 244.52) = 6.32; p < .003;  =.912). In the thematic-obligation 
task higher indices were obtained in those subjects who received violation 





1.b) Matching index 
    A significant effect was obtained with the instructions (F (1, 134) = 
11.31; p < .001). Participants obtained higher matching index with 
instructions for checking the rule (M=1.042) compared to those who 
received violation instructions (M=.58). 
 
 
    Similarly, significant effects were registered in the content (F (2, 268) = 
25.64; p <.0001). Concretely, the highest matching index was obtained with 
abstract content (M =1.11), followed by the thematic-obligation (M =.897) 
and the thematic-permission (M =.375). Abstract content differs 
significantly from the other groups (F(1,134) = 24.42; p < .0001) and similarly 
thematic-permission differs significantly from the thematic-obligation (F(1, 
134) = 26.97; p < .0001) by orthogonal tests. 
     
    2) Three-way mixed ANOVAS 
    Because the central questions being addressed involve group differences, 
we performed three-way mixed analyses of variance, with group (good vs. 
poor verbal comprehenders / good vs. poor reasoners), instructions (true-
false vs. violation instructions) and content (abstract, thematic-permission 
and thematic-obligation) as factors, with repeated measures on the last factor. 
    In terms of differential analyses there were no differences in the logical 
and matching indices among good and poor verbal comprehenders (PMA-V 
& Gernsbacher´s Comprehension Battery) or subjects with high and low 
scores in the PMA-R, but there were significant differences among good and 
poor reasoners (DAT-VR). 
    The logical index was considerably better (M=1.131) in the higher 
reasoning-verbal group vs. the group with low scores in the DAT-VR (M = 
.386). The differences were significant (F(1, 70) = 8.52; p < .005). 
    Similarly, for the matching index the interaction between group and 
instructions was significant (F(1,70)=5.02; p <.028. There were no differences 
in the matching index of good reasoners in function of the experimental 
instructions, but differences in the group with low scores in the DAT-VR 
 
 
were found. Particularly, the poor reasoners obtained highest matching 




3) CORRELATIONS OF THE EXPERIMENTAL TASK WITH THE  
PSYCHOMETRIC TESTS SCORES 
    We performed another analysis to provide a test of the relation among 
different measures in verbal and comprehension psychometric tests, the 
computerized measures of comprehension skills and the subjects´ 
performance in the experimental task with both logical and matching indices. 
 
 
The analysis were carried out (a) with the data from the total of 136 subjects 
and (b) with de data from the two experimental groups (true-false 
instructions and violation instructions). 
   The results show for the total sample (N=136) that: (a) the scores of the 
DAT-VR are related with the performance in Wason´s selection task with 
the abstract content (r = .317; p = .0001) and with the thematic-permission 
(r = .2656 ; p = .002) in terms of logical index and (b) there is a significant 
relation between scores in the DAT-VR psychometric test and the 
computerized measures of Gernsbacher´s Comprehension Battery (r = 
.1663; p = .05). 
    With the true-false instructions (N=63) there was found a significant 
relation between scores in the DAT-VR and the logical index (r = .3524; p = 
.005) and the matching index (r = - .3779; p = .002) with the abstract content. 
There was also a significant relation between measures in the Gernsbacher´s 
Comprehension Battery and the logical index for this abstract content (r = 
.2862; p = .023).  
    With the violation instructions (N = 73) there was a significant relation 
between measures in the DAT-VR and the logical index for the abstract 
content (r = .2939; p = .012) and the thematic-permission content (r = 






    From this study we draw the following conclusions: 
 1.- A good predictor for performance in Wason´s selection task was 
the DAT-VR psychometric test. 
 2.- There were differences in performance among subjects with high 
and low scores in the DAT-VR. The logical index was considerably better in 
the higher reasoning verbal-group. 
 3.- The poor reasoners in the DAT-VR obtained highest matching 
indices with instructions for checking the rule. There were no differences for 
the subjects with high scores in this psychometric task. 
 4.- There were no differences in the selection task performance 
between groups with scores high and low in the PMA-V, PMA-R 
psychometric tests and the Gernsbacher´s Comprehension Battery. 
 5.- The highest logical index was registered with thematic-obligation 
content, followed by the abstract content and the thematic-permission 
content. 
 6.- The highest matching index was obtained with abstract content, 
followed by the thematic-obligation and finally the lowest matching index 
was obtained with the thematic-permission content. 
 7.- The logical indices are higher in those subjects who received 
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